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Abrahamson and Fischer: All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium

ALL THE WORLD'S A COURTROOM:
JUDGING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM*
Shirley S. Abrahamson**
Michael J. Fischer***
I am honored to be here today. As a native New Yorker, I always
enjoy returning to my hometown and visiting the haunts of my youth.
The Hofstra University School of Law is in its youth. As a relatively
young school, it has already achieved national prominence for providing
a stimulating intellectual environment, for being receptive to new ideas,
and for its visions and perspectives. It is a special honor to join the
numerous distinguished jurists who have delivered the Howard Kaplan

Memorial Lecture.
The subject of my talk today is the increasingly worldly role state
judges might play as we approach the new millennium. I must admit
that I stumbled upon this topic while engaged in one of my more modest
and provincial roles as a state court judge-reading briefs in preparation
for hearing oral argument in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I was
* This Essay is an edited, annotated, updated, and slightly expanded version of the
Howard Kaplan Memorial Lecture delivered by Chief Justice Abrahamson at the Hofstra
University School of Law on April 17, 1996. Chief Justice Abrahamson wants to thank the faculty
of the University of Nebraska Law School for their helpful discussion of a draft of this Essay
presented at a faculty colloquium on February 11, 1997. This Essay was also presented as the
Louis Caplan Lecture in honor of the Hon. John P. Flaherty, Chief Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law on April 2, 1997.
The Authors want to thank Susan Fieber and Joanne Lin for their assistance in editing the
manuscript and preparing it for publication, as well as Wisconsin State Law Librarian Marcia
Koslov and the library staff for their help and patience. Chief Justice Abrahamson also expresses
thanks to Professors Catherine Adcock, Richard J. Bonnie, and Richard Cummins, and to Dean
Harvey Perlman for discussing the Essay with her.
** Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Essay speaks in the first person referring
to Chief Justice Abrahamson, as did the speech. Michael Fischer joins her as co-author in
recognition of his significant efforts in developing this topic and in the writing and editing of the
Essay while serving as Chief Justice Abrahamson's law clerk.
*** B.A. 1985, Yale University; M.A. 1987, University of Michigan; J.D. 1995, Harvard
Law School. Law Clerk to Justice Abrahamson 1995-1996. Mr. Fischer is presently an associate
with Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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reading the briefs in a case entitled Gould v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.,' which raised an age-old issue: Should persons with
mental illnesses or disabilities be held liable for their torts? And if so,
what standard of behavior should be used to gauge their tort liability?
More generally, what legal principles should govern tort law in a case

involving two "innocent" persons, namely, the disabled person who
unwittingly inflicted the harm and the innocent victim injured by the
disabled person?
In the Gould case, the defendant, a one-time farmer who had been
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, struck and injured the head nurse
in a health care center where he was confined. The court was asked to
resolve one issue: Should the farmer be judged by the traditional tort
standard of the reasonable person, or given that he was not capable of
either controlling or appreciating his conduct, should he be absolved
from civil liability altogether?2
In most states, including Wisconsin, the courts have concluded that
a mentally disabled person must be held to the same objective standard
of care as someone without such a disability. Thus the mentally disabled

are generally
held liable for their acts under the reasonable person
3
standard.

American legal scholars have sharply criticized this traditional
American rule. They point out that applying the reasonable person rule
to people with mental conditions, in effect, imposes liability without
fault, even though the law of negligence is ordinarily grounded in fault,
and even though liability 4is incompatible with modem views and
treatment of the mentally ill.
1. 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996).
2. See id. at 283-84.
3. For a history of the position of the American Law Institute in the Restatement of Torts
on this subject, see William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21
OHtO ST. L.J. 52, 52-53 (1960); Stephanie L Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in
Negligence Actions, 93 YALE LJ. 153, 155 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the
Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67, 92 (1995) (advocating a subjective standard
relieving individuals of liability who, due to mental illness, cannot prevent their own negligence);
Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV.
1, 55-57 (1995) (asserting that fundamental principles of fault-based tort law require a person's
mental disability to be accepted as a defense to certain tort liability); Catherine A. Salton,
Comment, Mental Incapacity and Liability Insurance Exclusionary Clauses: The Effect of Insanity
upon Intent, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1066-68 (1990) (proposing a standard similar to that used in
the defense of the mentally disabled in criminal law to interpret "intentional conduct" exclusionary
clauses in insurance policies). But see Splane, supra note 3, at 170 (contending that the objective
standard is appropriate for the mentally ill under the current mental health policy of integrating
mental patients into the community).
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Counsel for the farmer urged the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
adopt a rule that persons should be held liable only when they know
what they are doing. And like most lawyers urging a court to adopt a
new rule, counsel for the farmer sought to reassure the court of the
wisdom of change by pointing to law from other jurisdictions,
specifically Florida and Canada,7 which seemed to buttress her point. If
the new rule works there, her reasoning went, then surely it could work

in Wisconsin.
In response, while counsel for the injured nurse did his best to
distinguish the cases decided in the sister state of Florida,8 the Canadian
case was an entirely different matter altogether. "Petitioner is not
aware," the brief noted archly, "if Canadian case law has precedential
value in the United States." 9
Counsel, of course, knew quite well that it does not. But by the
same token, neither does Florida law have precedential value in
Wisconsin. Why then did the nurse's counsel single out Canada?
Probably because the law of foreign countries is treated today with the
suspicion that may have once marked some state courts' approach
toward the law of their sister states.
Today our state courts accept the logic behind Justice Cardozo's
famous remark, in a case involving New York and Massachusetts law.
New York is "not so provincial," Cardozo wrote, "as to say that every
5. The Court of Appeals held that "a person may not be held civilly liable [for negligence]
where a mental condition deprives that person of the ability to control his or her conduct." Gould
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 295, 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
6. The Florida cases cited were Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
and Mujica v. Turner, 582 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). See Respondent's Brief at 18 &
n.7, Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996) (No. 94-0074)
[hereinafter Gould Respondent's Brief].
7. The Canadian case cited was Buckley v. Smith TransportationLtd, [1946] O.R. 798. See
Gould Respondent's Brief, supra note 6, at 18. The Reporter's Notes to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B app. (1966), states that the Buckley case "held that insanity, which
prevented the defendant's driver from understanding his duty of care, or rendered him incapable of
performing it, prevented liability for negligence." lId
For recent discussions of the Buckley case, see for example, Canada v. Connolly [1989]
B.C.L.R. 162, where the application of Buckley to intentional and negligent torts is discussed, and
Hutchings v. Nevin, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1461, at *14-17, 25 (Aug. 5, 1992), a negligence case
which follows the rule in Buckley.
For a comparison of the tort liability of the mentally disabled in Canada and the United
States, see Pamela Picher, The Tortious Liability of the Insane in Canada... with a Comparative
Look at the United States and Civil Law Jurisdictionsand a Suggestionfor an Alternative, 13
OSGOODEHALLLJ. 193 (1975).

8. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Repondents-Petitioners at 8 n.2, Gould v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996) (No. 94-0074).

9. Id. (emphasis added).
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solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home."' But while state courts routinely look to the decisions of their
sister jurisdictions for the insights and persuasive value they potentially
possess, the nurse's counsel obviously viewed looking across our
national borders as an "inherently suspect activity.""
I was perplexed. Why did the farmer's counsel's citation of
Canadian law signal desperation and trigger derision? Why, I wondered,

should case law from Canada-an English-based, common law
jurisdiction geographically closer to Wisconsin than Florida-not be
considered persuasive?
The fact is that as the century draws to a close, the American bench
and bar are rarely reaching beyond our national borders when seeking
guidance in resolving domestic legal issues. 2 And this is not just a

1990s phenomenon. A quick Westlaw survey of Wisconsin cases
decided between 1942 and 1995 turns up thirty-nine citations to English

cases spread across thirty-four decisions. About one-fourth of the
citations are to cases decided before 1800; about two-thirds are to cases
decided before 1900. The mean time interval between the Wisconsin
decision and the English case cited is 123.9 years; in only two cases is
the interval less than ten years, and in only five cases is it less than

thirty.
10. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
11. Mary Ann Glendon, Irish Family Law in Comparative Perspective: Can There Be
ComparativeFamily Law?, 9 DUBLIN U. LJ.1, 2 (1987).
12. Professor Alain A. Levasseur found a mere 35 state court cases (excluding Louisiana and
Puerto Rico) during the second half of the twentieth century referring to French law. Furthermore,
some of these cases dealt with conflict of law issues in which the state courts were compelled to
consider the possible application of foreign law. See Alain A. Levasseur, The Use of Comparative
Law by Courts (II), 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 41, 57-59 (Supp. 1994). Professor Levasseur explained:
American judges do not venture much outside the law of the land may be because they
already have an extensive field of comparative analysis available to
them.... Drowning under this amount of American law, in a language known by all
and immediately usable, it is no wonder that foreign substantive law is not readily used
to solve internallegal issues.
Id. at 59. Professor David S. Clark commented:
Outside the recently emerging fields of international civil procedure and international
criminal law, there is scant legal literature on the use of foreign and comparative law in
United State courts because courts rarely cite foreign law. H-istorically, the situation
was different. Before the Civil War courts regularly referred to Roman law, civil law,
and English common law.... The comparative law leavening of indigenous American
law largely came to an end by the 20th century due to the influence of the historical
school of jurisprudence, the adequacy of the West Publishing Company's national
reporter and digest system in accumulating a corpus of American law, and the general
social force of nationalism.
David S. Clark, The Use of ComparativeLaw by American Courts (I), 42 AM. J. CoMp. L. 23, 2324 (Supp. 1994) (citation omitted).
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English law seems to be considered useful only if it is old. When
English cases are cited, it is most likely for their quaint historical value
rather than for their ability to persuade or for what they might say about
the current state of English law."
Canadian law fared even more poorly during this fifty-four-year
period: a Westlaw search of Wisconsin decisions from 1942 to 1996
yielded a grand total of three citations to Canadian cases, and one of
those involved a choice-of-law question. No American jurisdiction
appears to have ever cited the 1946 Canadian case referred to by the
farmer's counsel, and counsel herself failed to cite more recent
Canadian decisions that would have bolstered her argument.
Professor Alain Levasseur concluded that outside the academy,
"the relevance of comparative law is almost non-existent, which is

really a euphemism for 'nil.' Indeed, as far as the federal and most state
as a
courts in this country are concerned, foreign law is not 1considered
4
study."'
for
less
even
and
consideration
for
relevant topic
In the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in the farmer-nurse
case, reaffirming the civil liability of the mentally disabled, the court's
only reference to law from outside the United States was a recognition
that the civil liability rule was derived from dicta in a 1616 English
13. The computer search revealed:
(1) Thirteen of the citations to English cases appear in eleven Wisconsin cases published in
the 1980s; twelve appear in ten Wisconsin cases published in the 1970s; nine appear in eight
Wisconsin cases published in the 1960s; three appear in three Wisconsin cases published in the
1950s; and two appear in two Wisconsin cases published in the 1940s.
(2) Two of these citations are from seventeenth-century English cases; eight from
eighteenth-century English cases; fourteen from nineteenth-century English cases; and thirteen
from twentieth-century English cases. Two of the English cases had no dates.
The Authors also examined three volumes, selected at random, of the Wisconsin Reports
containing nineteenth-century Wisconsin cases. In volume 65, covering December 1885 to April
1886, eleven citations to English authority were located. In volume 80, covering June to December
1891, twenty-two were found. And in volume 95, covering January to April 1897, seventeen were
found. No doubt there are more. In any event these numbers are themselves impressive: in the
latter two volumes, each covering a period of less than one year, we found exactly the number of
citations (thirty-nine) that we found in our fifty-four-year survey of cases during the period from
1942 to early 1996.
14. Levasseur, supra note 12, at 41-42. Professor Levasseur continues:
Today, and even since the last decades of the last century, these courts have shown
no ...curiosity to look into comparative law (in the sense of foreign legal systems) as a
possible source of legal or natural law support for their own decisions or as a means of
providing a more cogent rationalization of their own rulings.
Id. at 42. For commentary about the teaching of comparative law in law schools, see Roscoe
Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum,8 TUL. L. REV.
161 (1934); Rudolph B. Schlesinger, The Pastand Future of ComparativeLaw, 43 AM. J. COMP.
L. 477 (1995); Symposium on Globalization,46 J. LEGAL EDuc. 311 (1996); and Arthur T. Von
Mehren, An Academic Traditionfor ComparativeLaw?, 19 AM. J.CoMP. L. 624 (1971).
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case.'5 The court did not press on to investigate what had happened in
English law after 1616. But would not the evolution of English common
law or Canadian law since 1616 have been useful to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in evaluating
whether it should retain allegiance to a
6
380-year-old doctrine?'
The questions began to come thick and fast. Why, even as we are
reminded daily that the global village demands an international
perspective on topics ranging from health care to trade to technology to
literature, do we not hear more about the international influences
shaping American law? The tariffs and political borders which have
divided us are crashing down. Why do the political borders continue to
matter so much for the American legal system? Are we lawyers and
judges suffering from legal xenophobia?
Compounding my confusion and adding to my questions was the
knowledge that while American lawyers and judges rarely venture
beyond our borders in looking for answers to domestic legal questions,
we have stepped up our role abroad in spreading the gospel about the
virtues of the American legal system. In recent years, American law has
become one of our chief exports. 7
For example, the American Bar Association's Central and East
European Law Initiative ("CEELr') has, with the support of the federal
government, dispatched scholars, practitioners, and judges into former
Soviet countries to review constitutional drafts and help formulate laws,
especially in the economic sphere. A vast array of scholarly writings

15. See Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Wis. 1996) (citing
Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616)).
16. Professor Robert Stevens concludes that the bonds between English and American
common law are overstated. "iThere are times when I feel that if I hear one more inane speech
about the bonds of the common law, I shall engage in homicide." Robert Stevens, Basic Concepts
and Current Differences in English and American Law, 6 J. LEGAL HIsT. 336, 336 (1985).
Professor Stevens continued:
[iThe differences in the English and American law are dramatic.... What has changed
most dramatically is the role of law and that is the most interesting issue. It is
interesting, in part, because in the last two and a half decades the English concept of
law has begun a subtle and limited shift towards the American concept of law at a time
when, possibly, the American legal culture is hankering for a little less instrumentality.
I do not mean to be so naive as to suggest that intellectually the two systems are going
to adopt an identical role for law, but the roles may become a little less dissimilar.
Id. at 346.
17. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTrruTIONALISM
AND RIGHTS 383 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed
Ideas: On the Impact of American Scholarship on Indian Law, 33 Am.J. CoMP. L. 505 (1985);
Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537

(1988).
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and statutory models pertaining to the organization of the legal
profession, legal education, and commercial, environmental, and
criminal law has been proffered to post-Communist legislators, judges,
lawyers, and legal educators.' 8
We are also exporting rules of judicial conduct and principles of
judicial administration. Under the auspices of the State Department, the
American Bar Association, the Ford Foundation, and others, delegations
of American judges and lawyers have visited eastern Europe and Asia to
explain how America's independent judiciary protects citizens' basic
legal rights against state action. 9 And in Cambodia, American lawyers
and judges have teamed up with their counterparts from Australia and
India to help Cambodian lawyers and judges develop a legal system. °
Meanwhile, the globalization of the American economy has
hastened the internationalization of American law firms. With deals
being struck from Bangkok to Budapest, numerous American firms
have established offices abroad.2' The lawyers in the firms' domestic
and foreign offices are learning about the laws of the countries in which
their clients do business. Even modest and seemingly small-town
American law firms are being affected by the change. For example,
lawyers working for a firm in Elkhorn, Wisconsin, population 6,301,
travel regularly to Japan on behalf of their client Kikkoman, which
grows soybeans and manufactures soy sauce in Wisconsin. Just check
the bottle. Kikkoman's Soy Sauce is a product of the great Dairy State.
But while growing numbers of American lawyers now recognize
the importance of other countries' laws for their clients, American
lawyers and judges seem to pay little or no attention to the law of other
countries when focusing on the domestic issues they litigate and
adjudicate here at home.
Maybe, I thought, American lawyers and judges are right.
Notwithstanding the glitz and glamour of international business
transactions, most American legal proceedings remain local affairs
involving family law, property disputes, criminal law, contract actions,
or tort liability. What insights could other countries' law offer the
18. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige:Legal Transplantsin Russia and Eastern
Europe, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 93, 110-11 (1995); Sandra Day O'Connor, The Life of the Law:
Principlesof Logic and Experiencefrom the United States, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1.
19. See Janet Key, Old Countries,New Rights, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 68.
20. The International Human Rights Law Group, based in Washington, D.C., oversees a
project in Cambodia.
21. See Ann Davis, Large Firms Are Bullish on Prospects Overseas, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,
1995, at C5; Sherry R. Sontag, Opening Offices Overseas: Does the Payoff Warrant the Huge
Expense?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 1.
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American legal profession? How, that is, might other countries' law
help settle disputes in our home villages. and towns in contrast with the
global village to which we nominally belong?
The only way to find out, I decided, was to take specific legal cases
with which I had wrestled recently as a state judge and explore whether
the law of other countries would have improved the lawyers' briefs or
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approach to the issues involved. From
my desk and the law library I would embark on an international tour to
discover whether the other countries of the world had any light to shed
on Wisconsin law.
I turned to the doctrine of informed consent, which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court addressed in 1995' and 1996. Simply put, under the
informed consent doctrine, a patient has a right to the information
necessary to make an intelligent decision regarding medical treatment
options. A doctor's failure to provide this information constitutes
tortious behavior.2
The courts of many jurisdictions around the world have struggled
to balance the values integral to the doctrine: individual autonomy vs.
efficient administration of justice and health care systems. In American
law, the informed consent doctrine has played a dominant role in the
quarter-century since the 1972 landmark Canterbury v. Spence
decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Jerry Canterbury was a nineteen-year-old clerk-typist who sought
care from Dr. William Spence for back pain. Suspecting a ruptured disc,
Dr. Spence recommended surgery. Questioned about the gravity of the
operation, Dr. Spence replied that it was no more serious than any other
operation. Canterbury consented to the operation; afterwards he was
partially paralyzed from the waist down. His ensuing lawsuit, as Judge
Robinson wrote, was "[i]n a very real sense ...an understandable
search for reasons.""
The court could find no reason why Canterbury was not told more
about the risks-including the possibility of paralysis-accompanying
his surgery. Although Dr. Spence had procured nominal consent to
operate, the court held that because he had not adequately explained to
Canterbury the risks he faced, any consent was void.2' The court held
22. See Martin ex rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995).
23. See Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).

24. See iL at 500-01.
25. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

26. Id.
at 776.
27. See id. at 791.
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that a doctor needs to procure a patient's intelligent consent rather than
simply going through the motions."
What, then, must patients be told before their consent to a
procedure or operation is considered intelligent and informed? Must
doctors tell their patients about infinitesimally small risks in
conjunction with the most routine of procedures? Must my doctor
inform me, for example, that the hepatitis vaccination I need for travel
to Borneo carries a 1 in 100,000 risk of paralyzing me?
Who gets to decide what I should be told? Should doctors
themselves set the standard? Should the standard be what a reasonable
person placed in my position would want to know? Or should the
standard be subjective, assessing what I, the particular patient bringing a
claim, would have wanted to know?29
The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed these issues in the 1975
case of Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.3" K.S. Scaria
had come to the United States from India and was teaching in a small
college in Waukesha, Wisconsin. At the age of forty-one, he went to see
an allergist because of hay fever attacks. In examining Scaria, the
allergist discovered that he was suffering from severe hypertension and
referred him to a specialist in internal medicine and cardiology."
The specialist recommended an aortagram, in which dye would be
injected into Scaria's femoral artery to determine whether a narrowing
of the arteries leading to the kidneys might be causing his high blood
pressure. When Scaria inquired about the risks accompanying this
procedure, his doctor characterized the procedure as routine. Scaria
testified that he was given the impression that there was only a 1 in
When he asked, "Is that all?" his
1,000 chance of any complications.
32
doctor replied, "That's all.
But that was not all. Scaria's doctor did not tell him that the
procedure could lead to the puncturing of the aorta, an allergic reaction
to the dye, paralysis, or even death. Within two hours of the procedure
Scaria was paralyzed from the waist down."
28. See id.
29. For discussions of the history and distinctions between the traditional professional
physician standard, the prudent patient standard, and the subjective patient standard, see generally
PAUL S.APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT 41-49 (1987); 3 DAvID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD
WLIAis, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE § 22.05 (1997); and 1 MILES J. ZAREMsIU & Louis S.
GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL AND HOSPrrAL NEGLIGENCE § 15.03 nn.16-20 (1995 & Supp. 11996).
30. 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
31. See id at 649-50.
32. Id. at 650.
33. See id at 650-51.
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The issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court was whether
Scaria's consent to the surgery had been informed. At trial, the jury was
instructed that what Scaria's doctor was required to disclose was limited
to that information "which physicians and surgeons of good standing
would make under the same or similar circumstances, having due regard
to the patient's physical, mental and emotional condition."' 4 Scaria
objected that this instruction gave his doctor the "sole power to decide
what information is to be imparted to the patient and what is to be
withheld on the ground that 'the doctor knows best.""'3 Citing
Canterbury, Scaria argued that the question of whether or not he had
been given enough information to render an informed consent to surgery
should not be dependent upon a self-imposed professional tradition. 6
In a 5-2 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with
Scaria, adopting what has come to be known as the prudent patient
standard. The court held that a reasonable physician standard allowing
doctors to establish what constitutes informed consent was too broad a
limitation on what patients might need to be told.37 Instead, the court
held, a doctor's duty should extend to and be determined by the
information which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would
have considered material in making a decision.38
But much like the Canterbury court, the Scaria court declined to
go further and allow informed consent to be measured according to the
needs of the particular patient bringing a claim. Under such a subjective
standard, the Scaria court reasoned, disappointed patient-plaintiffs,
operating with the benefit of hindsight, might claim that they would
have decided against surgery had they been better informed."
To return to my vaccination example, a subjective patient standard
would allow me, Shirley Abrahamson, to argue after the fact that had I
been told of the infinitesimally small risk of paralysis, I would have
foregone vaccination altogether, even if this decision would have
trebled my chances of contracting hepatitis.
In the twenty years since the Scaria decision the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has reaffirmed Scaria'sprinciples. In 1995 and again in
1996, we have rejected both a reasonable physician standard on the one

34. Id. at 652 (quoting the jury instructions given by the trial judge).
35. Appellants' Brief at 18, Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (W¥is.
1975) (No. 311).

36. See id at 18-19.
37. See Scaria,227 N.W.2d at 653.
38. See id at 653-54.
39. See id. at 655.
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hand,' and a subjective, patient-specific standard on the other.4 ' But
while Wisconsin continues to stay the course first charted in Scaria, a
vigorous debate taking place beyond American borders has placed the

prudent patient standard under a microscope.
Several foreign jurisdictions suggest that America's law of
informed consent has not gone far enough. The German Federal
Supreme Court, in an important 1984 decision on informed consent,
stated that, "[t]he patient's right of self-determination, which is meant to

be protected by the physician's legal duty of disclosure, extends to
decisions which according to medical judgement appear to be
indefensible.' ' 2 The question is not, the German court concluded, what a
reasonable patient would need to know and what a reasonable patient

would do with that knowledge, but rather what the particular patient
whose claim was at issue would need to know in order to render an
intelligent and informed consent.43
The concerns regarding patient autonomy expressed in the German
court's decision reverberate in other foreign jurisdictions as well. The
Australian appellate court of New South Wales unanimously rejected
the prudent patient standard and adopted the subjective standard in its
place. The prudent patient standard, said the Australian court, failed to
show "respect for the integrity of the patient as an individual, entitled to
have command over his or her body. ' 4 Prior to 1980, Canadian
appellate courts also championed the subjective standard.45
40. See Martin ex rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70,78-79 (Wis. 1995).
41. See Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495,502-03 (Wis. 1996).
42. Dieter Giesen, Vindicating the Patient's Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 273, 304 (1993) (quoting BGH, 7 Feb. 1984 VI ZR 174/82 BGHZ
90, 103 (111-112)).
43. See id. at 304-05.
44. Ellis v. Wallsend Dist. Hosp. (1989) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 553; see also Giesen, supra note 42,
at 303 (noting the rejection of the Canterburyreasoning by the Ellis court); Dieter Giesen & John
Hayes, The Patient'sRight to Know-A Comparative View, 21 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 101, 114-16
(1992) (noting foreign criticism of the Canterburydecision's failure to adequately protect patient
autonomy).
45. See Kelly v. Hazlett [1976] O.R.2d 290, 320; Koehler v. Cook [1975] W.W.D. 71. The
Canadian Supreme Court subsequently rejected the subjective standard, commenting:
I think it is the safer course on the issue of causation to consider objectively how far the
balance in the risks of surgery or no surgery is in favor of undergoing surgery. The
failure of proper disclosure pro and con becomes therefore very material. And so too
are any special considerations affecting the particular patient.
Reibl v. Hughes [1980] S.C.R. 880, 898.
The principle of self-determination in other medical contexts continues to be highly valued
by the Canadian appellate courts. The principle of self-determination, wrote the Ontario Court of
Appeal, presupposes "'the patient's capacity to make a subjective treatmentdecision, based on her
understanding of the necessary medical facts provided by the doctor and on her assessment of her
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Autonomy. Self-determination. Personal integrity. Patient dignity.
The vocabulary deployed in these cases was strikingly familiar to that
used in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's informed consent decisions. But
while the Wisconsin Supreme Court saw the prudent patient standard as
facilitating patient autonomy, courts adopting the subjective standard
saw the prudent patient standard as compromising the very autonomy it
was intended to promote.
Who, they rhetorically asked, was this prudent patient? If medical
experts and medical testimony were allowed to give this prudent patient
shape and hue, then how was the prudent patient standard different from
the reasonable physician standard? Didn't patient autonomy give a
patient the right to make "unreasonable" demands regarding what she
wanted to know, or indulge "unreasonable" fears when deciding
whether she should undergo surgery? Shouldn't doctors, once aware of
a patient's particular needs and fears, have an obligation to respect
them?
If you look at the American law of informed consent in isolation
from the rest of the world, you do not hear or ask these questions. You
get the impression that there is little to be said for the subjective
standard. As best I can tell, only two states, Oklahoma46 and Oregon,47
have adopted the subjective patient standard in informed consent cases.
Their decisions are recent and relatively short; neither addresses fully
the policy issues driving the debate in Australia, Canada, Germany, and
New Zealand." Only a wider angled legal lens reveals the potential
tensions between the prudent patient standard and the promotion of
patient autonomy.
I do not mean to suggest which of these standards-the prudent or
subjective patient standard-is right. I do mean to say that when courts
from around the world have written well-reasoned and provocative
opinions in support of a position at odds with our familiar American
views, we would do well to read carefully and take notes. At the very
least, we American judges should write our decisions with a conscious
own personal circumstances."' Giesen & Hayes, supra note 44, at 114 (quoting Malette v.
Shulman [1990] O.R.2d 417, 423-24 (upholding the right of a Jehovah's Witness patient to refuse
medical treatment)).
46. See Spencer ex rel. Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987); Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Okla. 1980).
47. See Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547,550 (Or. 1988) (in banc).
48. See, e.g., Giesen, supra note 42, at 303-04 (noting that opinions from Australia,
Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland are well-reasoned and directly explore the problems of
the subjective approach); Giesen & Hayes, supra note 44, at 119-22 (discussing Australian,
German, Canadian, and New Zealand opinions that have noted problems with the objective test).
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awareness that decisions from abroad, if considered, might complicate
and challenge our analyses.
I can already hear the objections. You cannot glean the substance
of a legal system from an examination of its particular rules of
substantive law, let alone from a smattering of opinions interpreting a
narrow issue. The law of a particular country is deeply rooted in that
country's history and traditions. It gives voice to aspirations, fears, and
priorities specific to that country's culture.49 Although the rhetoric and
terminology used by different jurisdictions may sound and even feel
similar, the same words and phrases can and often do convey different
meanings."° As one commentator has stated, "[A] good comparatist is
one who, while studying the law of any country, looks not merely at the
particular rules of its substantive law, but rather at the many processes
and institutions by which substantive law is transformed into reality.""'
Informed consent law may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
based on considerations such as whether bringing suit is difficult or
easy, whether expert testimony is generally available to plaintiffs, the
level of government involvement in providing services to individuals,
and the level of dignity accorded to individuals.
Admittedly, my foray into the informed consent law of other
countries involved almost no spadework into the respective countries'
legal cultures, and I have no extensive knowledge of the different legal
systems whose cases I share with you today. As a consequence, I may
misrepresent the legal traditions from which these cases come or fail to
discern nuances in the opinions.
But the risks inherent in exploring different legal systems are risks
that American lawyers and state court judges take every day. We are
already comparatists. We just don't think of ourselves that way.
The American federal system has made seasoned comparatists of
all of us. Every American law school class and casebook uses the
comparative law method, drawing upon examples and opinions from
numerous states and state courts. Every American lawyer and judge
must pay attention to the law developing in other state jurisdictions.
So when I, as a state court judge, figuratively leave my jurisdiction
searching for insights from court opinions issued in places like Alabama

49. See Christopher Osakwe, Rethinking the Communion Between the Common Laws of
England and the United States, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 855 (1988) (reviewing P.S. AT1YAH & R.S.
SUmzmRS, FORM AND SuBsTANcE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987)).
50. See id. at 855.

51. Id.at856.
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or Alaska, I venture into unfamiliar terrain. I may feel insecure, but I go
nevertheless. And thanks to my training as an American federalist, I
know what to do when I get there.
Of course, when I cite to or draw upon the reasoning of an
insurance case arising in Alabama or a products liability case arising in
Alaska, I never for a moment imagine that I have magically become an
expert in the law of either jurisdiction. Opinions from other American
state courts may respond to wrinkles and nuances in their own particular
legal and political histories about which I know little or nothing.
Nevertheless, those courts will frequently see such problems in a light
which, from my vantage point, is fresh and provocative. Those courts
inform and illuminate. They may help me formulate or clarify issues.
They may suggest a solution or possible alternatives. They may
challenge my perspective. In short, I wouldn't dream of doing without
the insights provided by these trips into unfamiliar terrain, even though
they can leave me feeling apprehensive.
Why shouldn't our experiences as American comparatists
embolden more American lawyers and judges to explore the law of nonAmerican jurisdictions in the same spirit? Why shouldn't we take
advantage of the comparatist instincts learned in our law schools and
practiced in our courts by venturing farther afield?
Indeed, we can cross the divide separating us from other
jurisdictions around the world. And if we do so with the modest intent
to borrow ideas on classifying, discussing, and solving a particular
problem, we should not be deterred by unfamiliarity with foreign legal
systems. We may fail to understand a particular system of law or even
misinterpret some foreign decisions. Nevertheless, we may also find
unexpected answers or new challenges to domestic legal issues."

52. See Thomas Allen & Bruce Anderson, The Use of ComparativeLaw by Common Law
Judges, 23 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 435, 443-444 (1994) (discussing how comparative law can be
used as an aid in proposing possible solutions to domestic legal issues); Mark Tushnet, Policy
Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. Rnv. 245 (1995) (exploring policy distortion in U.S. constitutional law by
analyzing recent constitutional experience in France and Canada).
Professor Glendon comments on the difficulties encountered in using foreign law in
domestic law cases as follows:
It is not at all easy to determine which foreign experiences are most relevant to
one's own situation, or in what, precisely, that relevance consists. In using comparative
law as an aid to law reform, it is even sometimes hard to tell whether a particular
foreign example should be regarded as a beacon or a warning. When comparatists look
at how problems in their own country are handled abroad, it is almost never with the
thought that they will find a "solution" which can be picked up, brought home, and
plugged in like some new electric appliance. Instead, what they usually hope for, and
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The judges who authored the foreign cases I turned up in my own
survey were clearly cognizant of the importance of surveying the
international legal landscape. They almost invariably reviewed the
international state of the law in the sphere being addressed.
In foreign cases on informed consent, references to Canterbury
were legion, even though several of the courts I examined had rejected
Canterbury's prudent patient standard. 3 But confronting and criticizing
Canterbury only strengthened the opinions of the foreign judges
adopting a different view.
To the extent that foreign courts call into question decisions such
as Canterbury, their opinions should be all the more valuable here at
home. Most American courts take the Canterbury framework for
granted and limit their analyses to how the framework should be
interpreted. By reading cases that reject the Canterbury framework
altogether, American courts can expand the range of questions they
should consider.
In fact, foreign opinions could function like superstar amicus
briefs, offering otherwise unavailable viewpoints, delivered from unique
perspectives, by some of the world's leading legal minds. But as far as I
can tell from their opinions, American courts are not reading these
superstar amicus briefs. 4

sometimes discover, is a source of inspiration and new ideas for working out their own
solutions to these problems. In the end, Montesquieu had it right when he said that a
country's law had to be suited to its own circumstances and traditions. And nowhere is
this more true than in the areas of family life and procreation. And yet, even in these
areas, modernization and mass communication have greatly reduced cultural
differences ....
Glendon, supra note 11, at 2 (footnote omitted).
53. See, e.g., Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors, 1 All E.R. 643, 658 (H.L. 1985)
(rejecting the Canterburyreasoning as inapplicable to English law); id. at 652-55 (Lord Scarman)
(agreeing with the objective test formulated in Canterbury, yet concurring with the dismissal of
the plaintiff's appeal for lack of evidence); Haughian v. Paine [1987] Sask. R. 99 (approving of the
analysis of Canterbury and the Canadian Reibl v. Hughes used in Lord Scarman's Sidaway
opinion).
54. The failure of American courts to refer to foreign law has not gone unnoticed by
commentators. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient De Loin: The 1988
CanadianAbortion Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 569, 577 (1989)
(noting that Canadian Chief Justice Dickson, in his Morgentaler opinion, did not "want to be
perceived as tracing the footsteps or repeating the stumbles of the United States Supreme Court");
John H. Langbein, The Influence of ComparativeProcedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 545, 550 (1995) (noting that in resolving abortion disputes, constitutional courts other than the
United States "have drawn on each other's experience" (footnote omitted)); Gerald L. Neuman,
Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and
Germany, 43 Amf. J. CoMP. L. 273, 274 n.4 (1995) (noting that U.S. courts do not pay "attention to
constitutional developments in other countries").
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For example, the lead Canadian abortion decision, Regina v.
Morgentaler," discussed decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
German Supreme Constitutional Court, and the European Court of
Human Rights. The most recent U.S. Supreme Court abortion decision,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,56 contains only one citation to judicial
developments on abortion in the rest of the world: a one-paragraph
footnote in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in part and dissent in
part, contrasting the leading German and Canadian abortion decisions as
opposing authorities.57
The case with which I began this talk, the Wisconsin tort liability
case involving the farmer with Alzheimer's disease and the nurse,
provides yet another example of American courts' failure to draw upon
legal developments in other countries. The Canadian case cited by the
farmer's counsel was hardly an isolated view of the civil insanity issue.
Argentina,58 Australia, 59 France6 and Japan 61 have all refused to hold
mentally disabled persons liable for tortious behavior. Because these
jurisdictions focus on fault and the cause of injury rather than on
compensation and the fact of injury, their courts' opinions offer a
different perspective on a central tension in American tort law: whether
the law's primary function should be fault-finding or victim
compensation.
Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that the German Supreme
Court or the European Court of Human Rights has the better view on
abortion. Nor am I suggesting that Canada's approach to the defense of
mental disability should be adopted in Wisconsin. That is not my
purpose here today.
What I am suggesting is that we ought not to assume that adoption
of a position by a majority of our states makes that position right and
renders further inquiry pointless. To do so would be like reading only
majority opinions and never turning to concurrences or dissents. I
suggest that American courts, although they rightly view themselves as
independent, can surely strengthen and better convey their message if
they are willing to broaden their vision. Hence, we should not deride a
party who cites Canadian law. We should be citing Canadian law

55. [1988] S.C.R. 30.
56. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

57. See id. at 945 n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. See Picher, supra note 7, at 222.
59. See id. at 212.
60. See id at 222.

61. See id.
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ourselves, along with law from the rest of the world.
What happens when our courts decline this challenge and the tough
thinking it requires? Professor Mary Ann Glendon has drawn attention
to the insularity of modem American constitutional law. As an example,
she contrasts the approach to the privacy rights of homosexuals in the
leading European case, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 2 and the later U.S.
Supreme Court case, Bowers v. Hardwick.' Several of the six opinions
in Dudgeon were filled with comparative law references, including
references to American jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court as well
as the attorneys for both parties in Bowers, decided six years after
Dudgeon, seem to have been unaware of the European precedent.6
Jeffrey Dudgeon, like his American counterpart Michael Hardwick,
charged that anti-sodomy laws violated his rights. Dudgeon brought his
claim under the European Convention on Human Rights while
Hardwick brought his under the U.S. Constitution. Dudgeon won and
Hardwick lost. Which outcome you prefer does not concern us here.
Rather, what concerns Professor Glendon, as she explains in her
excellent discussion of the two cases, is that the American Bowers
decision lacks the care evident in the Dudgeon court's consideration of
the controversial and legally difficult issues at stake. 65
The European Dudgeon court carefully balanced the state's
conceded interest in regulating some aspects of private sexual activity
with the individual rights that such regulation would inevitably
compromise. Both the majority and the dissent in the American Bowers
case, on the other hand, discussed privacy rights in absolutist terms.
Their disagreement, observes Glendon, was confined to whether
Hardwick was "in" or "out" of the protected sphere.
The European Dudgeon court carefully considered how other
countries, including the United States, had addressed the relation
between privacy rights and homosexuality; the six opinions issued in
Dudgeon contained thoughtful arguments on both sides. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Bowers, along with the lawyers of both principal
parties, ignored what Dudgeon had to offer.
62. 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40 (1980).
63. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
64. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIaHTs TALK 146-51 (1991).
65. See id. at 146-51; see also Brenda Sue Thornton, The New InternationalJurisprudence
on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725
(1995) (finding the United States "right to privacy" is not as extensive as international human
rights law); Jennifer F. Kimble, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom and Bowers v. Hardwick, 1988 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 200 (finding that the Bowers
court refused to classify "sexual rights" as "human rights").
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"The six Dudgeon opinions," Glendon writes, "issued by some of
the world's leading jurists, contained ideas and information that could
have focused issues, enlarged perspectives, improved the quality of
reasoning, and ultimately helped to place our Court's decisionwhichever way it went-on a sounder and more persuasive footing.""
Instead the Bowers Court perpetuated a trend that has characterized the
U.S. Supreme Court for the past 150 years.67
As an English commentator assessing the isolationist tendencies of

66.

GLENDON, supranote 64, at 152.

67. Justice Scalia has viewed international law and practices irrelevant in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989). In contrast, Justice
Brennan looked to international norms in his dissent in Stanford. See id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stevens, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, examined English law to determine
cruel and unusual punishment in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046-47 (1995). Justice Stevens
asserted that the highest courts in other countries have found persuasive arguments that execution
after inordinate delay infringes the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See id.
The opinions in Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997), also discuss the value of
examining the experience of other countries in regards to federalism issues in deciding the
constitutionality of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A and 42 U.S.C. § 3759). Justice Scalia
contended that comparative analysis is inappropriate, see Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2377 n.11; Justice
Breyer argued that the experience of other countries, even though differences exist, "may
nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem .....
"d.at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997), Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, noted that other countries are embroiled in the issue of physician-assisted suicide and
referred to the experiences of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and the
Netherlands. See idat 2266 n.16. The Chief Justice, however, did not analyze the approaches used
by the jurists of those countries.
Judges on other courts are referring to the domestic law of other countries as well as
international law. Judge Guido Calabresi looked to the constitutional courts of Germany and Italy
in discussing what courts should do when a law, rational when enacted, becomes increasingly
dubious over time. He wrote:
At one time, America had a virtual monopoly on constitutional judicial
review ....
[drawing] origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and
practice ....
These countries are our "constitutional offspring" and how they have dealt
with problems analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
Justice Hans Linde, writing for the Oregon Supreme Court, referred to the United Nations's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, and other international
documents in interpreting Oregon law in a case seeking to enjoin Corrections Division officials
from assigning female correctional personnel to certain duties. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123,
131 n.21 (Or. 1981) (in banc).
For a discussion of the application of international law in federal courts, see Alfred T.
Goodwin, InternationalLaw in the Federal Courts, 20 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 157, 162-66 (19891990).
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the American courts has said, "[P]erhaps it is now the Americans who
have assumed the attitude once ascribed to the British: when told how
things are done in another country they simply say 'How funny."' 68
But it isn't funny. And as the world continues to become smaller as
technological capabilities grow, the provincial attitudes of American
courts are becoming less excusable. Law from around the world is
literally at our fingertips.
Westlaw and Lexis as well as the Internet provide instant access to

foreign materials.69 Thanks to CD-ROM, hitherto almost inaccessible
materials from Asia and Africa are becoming available. When I was in
Indonesia in the summer of 1995, for example, the country's economic
statutes were being placed on CD-ROM--even though Indonesia's
statutes have not appeared in book form.
The Internet provides access to specialized library catalogues and
enables law professionals to communicate, form discussion groups, and
share ideas. Increasing numbers of judges can thus communicate with
each other across borders and oceans. Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter

has dubbed this phenomenon "transjudicial communication."7'

68. James Michael, Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 NEv L.J 831, 831 (1988). Justice Kirby,
President of the Court of Appeal of Australia, in his Farewell Speech on February 2, 1996,
commenting on what he considered as important aspects of his service on the bench, included his
practice of referring to non-English sources of judge-made law and to international norms. He
stated:
I was insistent that the Court should look beyond the traditional English sources of
judge-made law. In an early case I tried this out on Mr. R.P. Meagher QC, telling him
that I had seen relevant authority in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa. His
immortal response was: "Your Honour is such a tease." But nothing is stable in this
uncertain world. He has been known of late to cite international human rights norms in
support of his opinions. I am now patiently waiting for him to use feminist legal theory
to overrule Lord Eldon;
...[r]he reference to such international norms by me was at first thought heretical.
Justice Powell (and doubtless others) still think so. But I comfort myself in the memory
of my occasional dissenting opinions during my service in this Court. Now, elsewhere,
I may have a chance to convert heterodoxy into new legal principle. This, after all, is
the way our legal system operates-by an appeal to ultimate persuasion; ...
Justice M. D. Kirby, FarewellSpeech (last modified Feb. 2, 1996) <http://www.austlii.edu.au /au/
other /speeches/kirby_farewell.html>.
69. See P. John Kozyris, Essay, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New
Horizons and New Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REV. 165, 172 n.25 (1994).
70. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 100-01 (1994) (describing transjudicial communications and contending that as a result,
the quality of judicial decision making should improve worldwide); see also Allen & Anderson,
supra note 52, at 437-40 (describing uses for comparative law); Gfinter Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons:Re-thinking ComparativeLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 455 (1985) (noting that the
advantage of comparative law is that it provides the chance to re-evaluate legal norms); Kozyris,
supra note 69, at 168 (noting that language and cultural obstacles prevent the teaching of foreign
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If the world's courts increasingly talk to and about each other
while American courts persist in talking to and among themselves, it is
our law that will be deprived of the new ideas and solutions being vetted
around the globe. "[A] lawyer," writes Professor John Kozyris, "even in
the most mundane practice, will be impoverished if he wears the
blinders of his own jurisdiction."'
Professor Glendon, describing the rewards of comparative analysis,
has said:
We can only benefit from a heightened awareness of the ways in
which other nations have approached problems with which our own
legal system is currently struggling. Even though legal devices
developed in other countries are rarely suitable for direct transplant,
they often serve the cause of law revision and reform by showing that
our range of choice may be wider than we had imagined, and by
alerting us to the potential drawbacks as well as the possible
advantages of alternative methods of proceeding. The study of foreign
experiences can also be a fertile source of inspiration and ideas. And
even when it does not immediately move us into a new stage of
thinking, it nearly always affords us a deeper understanding of, and a
more balanced perspective on, our own law.72
Whether other countries' legal developments will move our courts
into a new stage of thinking, there is no question that changes in the
world as a whole have catapulted our courts onto a new stage in a legal
production as wide as the globe itself. Under such circumstances, stage
fright is understandable. But like it or not, the world is now our
courtroom. The question confronting our courts as we approach the year
2000 is whether we are willing to do what it takes to be world-class
players.

law in law schools); Langbein, supra note 54, at 554 (stating that American court's "disdain for
Continental lav rests upon a witch's brew of ignorance, prejudice, and venality"); Ferdinand F.
Stone, The End to Be Served by ComparativeLaw, 25 TUL. L. Rnv. 325, 326 (1951) (discussing
the rationale for, and value of, comparative legal analysis).
71. Kozyris, supra note 69, at 168.
72. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 4 (1989).
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